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ABSTRACT 
In the years since the September 11 attacks of 2001 and following the Gulf Coast 
hurricanes and the earthquake in Haiti, research has shown that first responders and 
medical institutions remain insufficiently prepared to address the increased demands for 
emergency response during and following major disasters.  The threat from terrorism and 
natural disasters is very real; thus, the medical “system” will face continual challenges.  
A brutal recent reminder of this was the international outbreak of the H1N1 virus that 
caused a worldwide pandemic in 2009, resulting in an increased demand for medical 
services.  
In the wake of these disasters Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) 
were issued.  Among these are HSPD 21, Public Health and Medical Preparedness, which 
requires the establishment of a realistic strategy at all levels of government and across all 
sectors in the medical response community to meet the demands of contemporary 
preparedness. Areas of concern include the education and training for future response.  
To meet these needs, joint training of responders may enhance the efficiency of currently 
established training methodologies for national disaster teams, civilian hospital 
personnel, and National Guard and Reserve military emergency medical personnel 
training in domestic emergency medical deployment and response.   
The research questions to be answered is how can the national policy enterprises 
design an effective model for the pre-event joint command and control training of 
disaster responders for both military and civilian operations?  
The conclusions reached in this research can be used to shape future national and 
local training policies and curriculum presented to response agency leaders from civil and 
military agencies.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Despite the passing of 10 years since the 9/11 attacks, the military community, 
hospitals, and the civilian first responder system have a recurring theme in after action 
reviews of the responses to disasters there remains a lack of a coordinated national effort.  
While this continuing lack of coordination can be attributed to a wide range of causes, 
this research effort explores national policy and civilian medical and military doctrine 
developed to address the lack of joint training. The goal of integrating these pre-event 
training regimens is to enhance capacities and capabilities to meet the demands of future 
responses.  
In recent years, the government responses to major disasters, particularly at the 
national level, have shown a lack of a coordinated command and control effort during the 
emergency. As discussed in the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) 
(DHS, 2010) report, by their very nature, disasters occur locally, but resident capabilities 
can easily be overwhelmed or reach a point of culmination in events of significant 
magnitude. In such situations, a unified effort is required to ensure rapid, integrated 
response to save lives, protect property, and mitigate further damages. 
During large-scale disasters, military personnel are often called upon to backfill or 
augment civilian responders and medical professionals who mounted the initial response; 
however, integrating military responders into a civilian-led response is often 
unsuccessful. The presence of diverse and un-integrated support networks among military 
and civilian healthcare responders hampers response.  As is often the case, each response 
organization functions under disparate regulations or standards for civilian preparedness 
that can differ from those of military responders. The presence of barriers, such as the 
lack of common vocabulary between civilian and military medical responders, prevents 
effective responses. 
National level policy directives after September 11, 2001, outlined a new 
direction for preparedness. For example, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21: 
Public Health and Medical Preparedness recognizes that the response functions of public 
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health and medical preparedness are intended to integrate all levels of government (White 
House, 2007). Areas of concern raised by emergency response agency leaders include 
pre-event education and training of both military and civilian responders (M. Zanker, 
personal communication, June 18, 2011).   
During major events, civilian medical professionals and administrators of health 
care facilities are often faced with decisions about how to care for patients (including 
when and how to evacuate patients if medical facilities become unable to support 
adequate care), what treatment to provide, or what services may be required. Military and 
civilians responder teams can and must be working together during these events to save 
lives.  
The Government Accountability Office (2006) has studied how these health care 
systems responded during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and explored the challenges 
involved in evacuating vulnerable populations, including those in hospitals and nursing 
homes. In the initial response to Hurricane Katrina, high numbers of acutely ill and 
injured people required evacuation from the city of New Orleans. The flooding had 
destroyed the medical delivery system in the city and the National Disaster Medical 
System (NDMS) had been deployed to support this evacuation.   
A reoccurring theme in after-action reviews of the responses to disasters is that 
there remains a lack of a coordinated national effort.  While this failure of coordination 
can be attributed to a wide range of causes, this research effort explores national policy 
and civilian and military doctrine developed since the September 11, 2001, attacks.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
There is an awareness that military and civilians responder teams can and must be 
working together. The National Alliance for Integration of Civilian Military Domestic 
Disaster Medical Response concluded that Hurricane Katrina exposed systemic civilian-
military coordination problems (Cannon, Fuka, Paturas, & Smith, 2007). First responders, 
military personnel, and medical institutions remain insufficiently prepared to coordinate 
their disaster response operations following a terrorist attack or disaster due to the lack of 
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joint pre-event training and practice.  This issue was recognized as a problem for the state 
of Connecticut and the realization that this may be a national problem.  
Participation in an environment designed to train personnel, reinforce these skills, 
and integrate clinical, logistical, and leadership skills in a collaborative atmosphere can 
strengthen individual and group skills in support of real time disasters. While there has 
been a slow evolution of the organizational culture toward joint training for civilian and 
military responders, such training is still relatively rare.  Further study is required into the 
obstacles that hamper joint training of both civilian and military disaster response 
personnel.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the military community, 
hospitals, and the civilian medical first responder system have failed to integrate fully 
their pre-event training regimens to enhance future responses. The research questions to 
be answered are:   
1. Will interagency training integration provide the basis for enhancing 
national disaster planning efforts? 
2. How can we design an effective model for the pre-event joint 
coordination-training program for medical disaster responders from both 
the military and civilian medical sectors? 
3. How can we change the cultural mindset of military and civilian leaders to 
include pre-event joint coordination training of disaster responders into 
their drill and exercise planning? 
C. BACKGROUND 
Throughout the history of the country, outbreaks of infectious disease and 
disasters have caused death and destruction.  A recurring theme is a lack of a coordinated 
national effort to confront these challenges. The nation’s military was established in the 
Constitution to provide for the defense of the nation from all enemies’ foreign and 
domestic. In the past 50 years, the military has taken on a new roles requiring enhanced 
support for civilian authorities during times of crisis.  The following topic areas are 
relevant to this research: 
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1. Uncoordinated disaster responses, which lead to a delayed response. 
2. Command and control 
3. National strategic planning needed to assure consistent service delivery 
4. Defense support to civilian authorities provides additional resources 
5. Obstacles to integration include outdated federal and state laws 
6. Joint training environment for consistent education of all responders 
7. Exercise and evaluation  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This research effort explored current national policy and civilian and military 
doctrine related to medical response and recovery to disasters developed since the 
September 11, 2001, attacks. This literature review groups findings into relevant subject 
areas including: uncoordinated disaster response, national health and medical strategic 
planning, defense support to civilian authorities, obstacles to integration that include 
outdated laws and training environments providing for consistent education of all 
responders 
1. Uncoordinated Disaster Responders 
In response to these disasters, military units, first responders, and medical 
institutions have worked diligently to plan for provision of services.  A lack of 
coordination, however, has hampered these responses. 
a. Response Failure to Katrina 
Former White House advisor Francis Townsend wrote in a federal report, 
entitled The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lesson Learned, that there were 
several failures in the response of several federal agencies.  According to Townsend 
(2006, p. 4), the nation must do a much better job of preparation and planning, to improve 
the response.  The report further blamed a lack of communications between emergency 
responders and the public, which during the crisis added to the loss of life and destruction 
of property (Townsend, 2006). The current system for homeland security does not 
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provide the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed by twenty-first century 
catastrophic threats.  The preexisting framework of local, state, and federal resources 
cannot anticipate and overcome all challenges in a crisis. 
The Townsend report stated further that, active duty military and National 
Guard “operations were not coordinated and served two different bosses, one the 
President and the other the Governor” (Townsend, 2006 p.2).  In after action reviews of 
the response, one of the recognized failure were Command and Control (C2).  
The National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Plan was not 
implemented, which led coordination issues between Department of Defense (DoD) 
resources and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the state of 
Louisiana. This slowed the response of active duty personnel and equipment. The 
Townsend report also found that once National Guard, Coast Guard, and DoD response 
operations were begun, they provided good support to state and local officials.  This 
report also praised the efforts of active duty forces, including the Coast Guard, as one of 
the only federal departments that possessed real operational capabilities to translate 
Presidential decisions into prompt, effective action on the ground (Townsend, 2006, p. 5).   
This was point was further emphasized in a 2006 military news article 
entitled “The Army Response to Hurricane Katrina” (Berthelot, 2006). 
By the time Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, America’s military 
was mobilizing for emergency response. Almost 10,000 National Guard 
troops were on the ground in Louisiana and Mississippi. The commander 
of the First Army, Lieutenant General (LTG) Russell Honore, who had 
experience with flood and hurricane relief, realized that the storm would 
make landfall along the border of two states, each falling under the area of 
responsibly of different chains of command of both the Army and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Concerned that 
command and control would become an issue, he requested that the 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) establish a joint area of 
responsibility. NORTHCOM activated its battle staff when the hurricane 
made landfall and selected LTG Honore to head Joint Task Force Katrina 
with First Army in the lead and Fifth Army in support. 
Several federal agencies have reviewed the issue of DoD support during 
disasters. The GAO (2006) report GAO 06-643 analyzed DoD civil support guidance and 
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plans and met with DoD and FEMA officials regarding the support that civilian 
authorities may request during a catastrophic incident. This GAO report concluded that 
DoD capabilities must be better identified and integrated into the nation’s response plans. 
A Congressional report entitled A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina (U.S House of Representatives, 2006) explored the role of military 
assets and personnel as one facet of this response.  The report found that the military 
played an invaluable role but coordination was lacking (U.S House of Representatives, 
2006). There has been a slow evolution of the organizational culture of both civilian and 
military responders.  These cultural barriers can be overcome by creating a joint 
environment where responders and medical professional can train side by side to form a 
cohesive team during actual response.      
A report commissioned by U.S. Northern Command compiled by the Yale 
New Haven Hospital Center for Emergency Preparedness entitled Strategies and 
Programs to Integrate Civilian-Military Domestic Disaster Medical Response for 
Homeland Defense concluded that both the military and the civilian sectors have 
significant resources, which may be mobilized in the event of an emergency or disaster 
(2007). Unfortunately, their respective organizational structures and lack of integration 
with each other have the unintended consequence of an ineffective mass casualty 
response, adding to the loss of life. 
An example of this is CT-1 Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) 
personnel following their federal deployment after Hurricane Ike reported lack of 
coordination. Former team Medical Officer (R. Kamin, personal communication, April 
13, 2011) reported that members of the DMAT team had been integrated into preexisting 
response operations run by members of a military unit. Kamin also reported that it was 
difficult for DMAT personnel to provide direct patient care while learning the command 
and control and logistics of the United States Army medical unit operating at the disaster 
site.    
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A report release by the Institute of Medicine entitled, The Future of the 
Public’s Health in the 21st Century (2002), presented a comprehensive framework for 
integration of government public health agencies, working with multiple partners from 
the public, military, and private sector. The report highlights that an effective public 
health system that can assure the nation’s health requires the collaborative efforts of a 
complex network of people and organizations in the public and private sectors (Institute 
of Medicine, 2002).  This includes an integration of operational policies and practices on 
the part of public health, military, and response agencies at the national, state, and local 
levels.  
2. Command and Control 
All incidents start locally and end locally and ultimately the governor of the 
affected area is in charge of the response. It is rare, other than in large-scale events, that 
the President directs forces to provide federal support to the states, without a request for 
assistance from the governor.  In every disaster response, the governor retrains control of 
his or her National Guard personnel under the direction of the State Adjutant General. 
In the area of the hospital and health care systems, the management structures 
resemble those of military units. It is a top-down management hierarchy with Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) providing the Command and Control (C2) for the organization.  
Each section of both the health care delivery and disaster response system are a complex 
adaptive system. One sub-specialty relies on the next to assure a continuity of care for 
each patient.  
a. Marine Corp Command and Control 
Military units are accustomed to operating under strict operational polices 
with strong Command and Control of personnel. An example of the military command 
and control doctrine is published in the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Control 
manual for officers (United States Secretary of the Navy, 1996). This manual describes 
how Marines can reach effective decision-making and implement how to take actions 
faster during any conflict (United States Secretary of the Navy, 1996).  This manual 
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represents a commitment by the Marine Corps to create a cultural shift in the way its 
leaders deal with the challenges of command and control in the digital age (United States 
Secretary of the Navy, 1996).  It is designed for application across the full range of 
military actions from humanitarian assistance on one extreme to general war on the other. 
The skills depicted are to apply equally to all members of the Marine Corp from small-
unit leaders to senior commanders. It sets the culture for conduct amongst all members of 
the Marine Corp weather engaged in war fighting or peacetime activities.  An example of 
strictly adhered to chain of command is depicted in organizational chart for the 14th CST:  
 
Figure 1.   Overview of CT National Guard (From Schulthess, 2011) 
b. Adaptive System 
The delivery of disaster response and austere medical care are affected by 
the leadership culture of the agency or organization from which the personnel hale. The 
way in which personnel are oriented to their organizational environment by agency 
leaders is a complex adaptive system.  During a disaster, the chaotic state has no 
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discernible order (Bellavita, 2006). There are no patterns. When lives are at stake, there is 
no time to wait for systems to organize themselves. Stability may have to be imposed 
through knowledge, by authoritarian response, or by charismatic leadership. In 
contrasting the military and civilian disaster responders, the command and control of 
personnel is a key fact in mission success and the safety of responders.  
c. Civilian Command and Control 
Civilian first responders routinely use the incident command system (ICS) 
as their C2 structure for response. ICS is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident 
management approach. It was a resulted of the incident management problems 
encountered by wild land firefighters battling several large fast moving fires in the early 
1970s. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) further defines ICS as a 
system which: 
1. Allows for the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, 
and communications operating within a common organizational structure. 
2. Enables a coordinated response among various jurisdictions and functional 
agencies, both public and private.  
3. Establishes common processes for planning and managing resources. 
(FEMA, 2011) 
ICS is flexible and can be used for incidents of any type, scope, 
and complexity. ICS allows its users to adopt an integrated organizational structure to 
match the complexities and demands of single or multiple incidents. 
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Figure 2.   ICS Command Organizational Chart (From FEMA, 2011) 
d. Hospital Command and Control 
Hospital personnel use a modified version of ICS called the Hospital 
Incident Command System (HICS). HICS is a methodology for using ICS in a 
hospital/healthcare environment.  The California EMS Authority (2006) developed this 
system. It was designed to assist hospitals in improving their emergency management 
planning and response. The system is tailored to the environment in which these medical 
providers operate including hospitals and other health care setting.  The overarching goal 
of this program is to improve health care facilities emergency management planning and 
response capabilities for both planned and unplanned events.  HICS and ICS both are 
designed to work within the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  NIMS 
guides government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector partners on a 
systematic approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels to work 
collaboratively during disaster responses. 
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3. Data Sharing 
a. Patient Care Records 
One example of an obstruction to response that transcends both military 
and civilian operations involves how the documentation of patient’s care is generated and 
kept.  This documentation ranges from simplified paper and pen records to Web-based 
Electronic Medical Records (EMR).  The collection of patient care data is also conducted 
in a variety of fashions across each discipline, including an electronic format based on 
organizational driven proprietary software platforms as well as in standard paper formats 
that comply with federal record keeping laws, such as the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Enacted in 1996, the law outlines how the civilian 
medical system handles personal health information. The burden of documentation for 
military care in a combat situation is much less than in the civilian medical system.  
b. Role of Medical Intelligence 
In addition to C2, the concept of sharing of intelligence among individuals 
of different agencies and disciplines is a critical component of response. The collection 
processing and sharing of situational awareness data has a direct impact on mission 
success. Each organization both military and civilian has an information technology area, 
which dictates in what formats and media that agency data is collected and shared.  The 
public health and health care system is both a consumer of and contributor to this 
intelligence system in support of situational awareness.  
The National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) is a renaming of a 
pre-existing agency within the Department of Defense.  On March 20, 2009, James R. 
Clapper, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, instituted DoD Instruction Memo 
Number 6420.01. The memo defined these efforts: 
There will be a unified defense community for medical intelligence 
activities; those activities will be executed in a coordinated and coherent 




national security objectives, and in accordance with all applicable laws, 
Presidential directives, DoD issuances, and Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) guidelines. (DoD, 2009) 
This new agency is based at Fort Detrick, Maryland and was formerly the 
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC). Its new mission is to “track and 
assess the full range of global health issues for the DOD, specifically monitoring and 
analyzing health events that could negatively impact the health of U.S. military and 
civilian populations” (DoD, 2009). 
4. Role of NORTHCOM 
Federal troops may be called in to assist states when local and state resources are 
overwhelmed, as was concluded in the retrospective review of the response to Hurricane 
Katrina (Townsend, 2006, p. 5).  The affected state failed to keep up with size and scope 
of the event. Based on the nature of the federal troops, they usually have very little pre-
event interaction with civilian leadership and local infrastructure, which hampers 
response.   
After September 11, 2001, the integration of military personnel was so important 
to the nation that, in April of 2002, President Bush signed an authorization establishing 
the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). USNORTHCOM was established to 
provide command and control of DoD homeland defense efforts and to coordinate 
defense support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM was to organize and position DoD 
assets to meet the emerging threats facing the nation. One of its primary missions is to 
provide military support to civilian authorities.  
Despite this mandate to NORTHCOM, coordination problems still exist when 
both military and civilian responders operate at the same incident. The need continues to 
exist for a strategic national plan for response.   
DSCA was also outlined in a presentation on April 5, 2011 to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee during their review of the fiscal year (FY) 2012 budget request for 
future years Defense Programs. In testimony that was presented by U.S. Navy Admiral 
James Winefeld, the commander of U.S. Northern Command Admiral Winefeld opened 
 13 
his remarks by saying that he was very encouraged by the strong partnership that 
USNORTHCOM has with the National Guard; they are essential to operational success 
across the full spectrum of missions (Winefeld, 2011).  The National Guard units are 
currently developing additional capabilities to take on a much larger role in support of 
consequence management in the aftermath of a chemical, biological, radiological, or 
nuclear attack.  He went on to say that, North America faces a changing world that 
presents us with many challenges (Winefeld, 2011).  These include violent extremists, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and rogue nations.  
As part of its strategic planning effort, USNORTHCOM published its Pandemic 
Flu Response Plan (Reale, 2011). It looked at the complexity of the pandemic 
environment that USNORTHCOM might have to respond in. The plan examined how 
USNORTHCOM was structured and positioned to respond to an infectious disease 
outbreak in its area of responsibility (AOR).  USNORTHCOM headquarters is organized 
in the traditional military hierarchal staff structure consisting of directorates based on 
staff functions.  This mindset is based on the various mission sets of DoD, which includes 
“force readiness” (Lieutenant. Colonel (LTC) J. Reale, personal communication, April 1, 
2011). 
These mission statements of DoD address the ability to project force and 
capabilities in order to deter and defeat any enemy force.  The mission of 
USNORTHCOM is to conduct homeland defense and civil support operations within the 
assigned area of responsibility (AOR) to defend, protect, and secure the United States and 
its interests.  It is a unique mission for a military organization because it takes a defensive 
posture and requires a supporting role to civilian agencies.   
This places USNORTHCOM personnel and leadership in new and uncharted 
waters.  Reale concluded that it is the first time in many of the military commander’s 
careers that they must deal with civilian agencies, politicians, and political appointees 
(LTC J. Reale, personal communication, April 1, 2011). They have now must have 
additional direct interactions with state emergency managers and emergency management 
agencies, FEMA, DHS, and many other federal, state, and local agencies and politicians 
(LTC J. Reale, personal communication, April 1, 2011).  
 14 
a. Dual Status Command Training 
To avoid future confusion, the National Guard Bureau and NORTHCOM 
have adopted a new concept called contingency dual status command.  NORTHCOM has 
been certifying National Guard Commanders to fill a dual command role when federal 
troops are deployed to a state while providing support to a response. In the event of a 
large-scale event, the certified National Guard Commander is given temporary federal 
statutes under U.S. Code Title 10 to command federal and state troops in a dual fashion 
with their respective federalized counterparts acting as their deputies.  This has been 
shown to be effective during the preparations for the large domestic events such as the 
G8 Summits and National Political Conventions. 
In addition, the National Guard has created a joint force headquarters in 
each state to insure that domestic operations are coordinated between the Air and Army 
Guard units.  As part of this coordination effort, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) 
processes all requests for National Guard forces requested through the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) process for intra-state response. 
Engaging the partnerships of agency leaders while engaged in interagency 
and organizational response is essential to preparedness.  These preparedness activities 
must be conducted well in advance of an incident response (Colonel S. Gilbert, personal 
communication, April 14, 2011). This will be accomplished by a combination of 
planning, resources, training, exercising, and organizing to build, sustain, and improve 
operational capabilities.  C2 is layered across all supporting capabilities and agencies at 
federal, state, and local levels allow for planning together in the periods between incident 
responses.  Each person brings a distinct learning style to individual and group 
interactions.  In the research on group interactions, Stewart Tubbs writes that strategies 
for effective communication and collaboration in a group allow teams to attain great 
potential (2007, p. 102). By sharing interpersonal intelligence, each team member can 
help bring the group together by teaching cooperation to achieve group objectives. 
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5. National Strategic Planning 
a. National HLS Strategy 2007 and 2011 
The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes the need 
for military involvement in homeland defense and security:  
Our Nation’s armed forces are crucial partners in homeland security.  Our 
active, reserve, and National Guard forces are integrated into communities 
throughout our country, and they bring to bear the largest and most diverse 
workforce and capabilities in government to protect the United States from 
direct attacks and conduct missions to deter, prevent, and defeat threats 
against our Nation.  (HSC, 2007, pp. 50–51) 
b. HSPD-21 
In the wake of these disasters, the nation attempted to establish a realistic 
strategy at all levels of government.  One of these national level policies, which outlined 
a new direction for preparedness, is Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21: Public 
Health and Medical Preparedness (White House, 2007). It recognizes that the functions 
of public health and medical preparedness and response are designed to integrate all 
disciplines. Areas of concern raised by emergency response agency leaders include 
education and training of both military and civilian response leaders.  
c. Presidential Policy Directive-8 
On March 30, 2011, President Obama issued Presidential Policy 
Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness. This new policy directive was designed to 
strengthening the security and resilience of the United States.  It reinforces that national 
preparedness is the shared responsibility of all levels of government, the private and 
nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens (White House, 2011, p. 1). 
6. Defense Support to Civilian Authorities   
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) is defined as the provision of 
support by all branches of the military to civil authorities as directed by the Secretary of 
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Defense (SECDEF). The constitutional issue of states’ rights influences the use of this 
military support as they apply to the handling of disasters. This question is beyond the 
scope of this research effort. 
DSCA support is available to all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories and possessions. This military 
assistance can be given during civil or public health emergencies arising during peace or 
wartime.  These incidents include terrorist threats or attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies.  The DSCA mission is now a part of military doctrine as a core competency 
for military personnel across all branches. 
An example of success resulting from the new DSCA mission is the integration of 
National Guard Joint Task Force Civil Support Teams (CST). In the state of Connecticut, 
the 14th CST is an integral part of the state’s homeland security prevention and response 
strategic plan. 
a. History of the Role of the United States Military 
The mission of the Department of Defense is to provide for the common 
defense of the nation, its citizens and its allies and to protect and advance U.S. interests 
around the world. To accomplish this mission, the Department maintains trained forces 
ready to respond to threats to U.S. security arising anywhere on the globe.  These same 
military forces that help shape the international environment can also respond quickly to 
threats to U.S. security when crises arise.  
Throughout the 370-year history of the National Guard, both nationally 
and on a state level, personnel have provided support to civilian authorities. Examples of 
this support in Connecticut include a response in 1984 where military personnel assist 
local responders during extreme flooding on the Connecticut River and during a large-
scale labor action against over 200 nursing homes in Connecticut (Colonel S. Gilbert, 
personal communication, April 14, 2011). Members of the 118th Medical Battalion were 
trained and standing by to provide staffing at many facilities to assure patient care and 
safety was not interrupted by the strike. 
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b. 1950 Civil defense Act 
Starting in the 1950s, the government recognized the need for military 
support of civilian authorities in times of crisis.  Passed in 1951, the Federal Civil 
Defense Act was intended by Congress to provide “a system of civil defense for the 
protection of life and property in the United States from attack and from natural disaster” 
(Buchalter, 2007). Since that time, this concept has undergone several revisions.  
c. Title 10 and 32 
The Department of Defense (DoD) executes its authority and 
responsibilities as outlined in the Federal Code. Title 10 covers the roles for the active 
duty military, as well as the reserve components.  The roles and responsibilities of the 
active duty National Guard are outlined in Title 32 of the Federal Code.  Both are broadly 
based and supported by volumes of directives and policies at DoD and NGB. These are 
also influenced by the constitutional issue of states’ rights as they apply to the handling 
of disasters. This question is beyond the scope of this research effort. 
d. Stafford Act 
The in 1994 the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance law was enacted. This allowed active duty military personnel and equipment 
to support domestic consequence management operations.  This act was updated again in 
2004 to allow for the use of National Guard forces in support of homeland defense 
activities.  
e. Defense Logistics 
Military units possess large numbers of well-trained and well-equipped 
personnel for their war fighting missions. These capabilities have versatility for 
supporting domestic disaster operations.  They are supported by large logistics and 
planning components. This includes traveling with both food and potable water for all 
missions. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides this logistical support.  The  
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mission of the DLA is to provide nearly 100 percent of the consumable items America’s 
military forces need to operate from food, fuel, and energy, to uniforms, medical 
supplies, and construction and barrier equipment (DLA, 2010). 
7. National Response Framework 
Military support to civilian authorities is an integral part of the National Response 
Framework (NRF) published by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  The 
National Response Framework is a guide that details how the country conducts all-
hazards response (FEMA, 2008). It is scalable system to deal with small incidents 
scalable up to the large-scale catastrophes.   
The NRF identifies the key response roles and structures to organize a national 
response.  It describes how cities, towns, states, and the federal government will interact 
with private sector and nongovernmental partners (FEMA, 2008). The goal of the NRF is 
to put in place structures and training to ensure a unified national response.  The plan also 
includes Emergency Support Function Annexes.  It delineates a unified command and 
coordination amongst all responding and supporting agencies, local, state, and federal 




Figure 3.   Joint Field Office Table of Organization (From FEMA, 2008) 
8. Obstacles to Integration 
Even with the organization of USNORTHCOM, the use of active duty military 
personnel in domestic responses faces obstacles. Coordination problems continue to exist 
that need to be overcome. These include legal, organizationally based cultural 
differences, chain of command structures, and varied working environments. A long-
standing legal obstacle is the Posse Comitatus Act, a federal law that limits the use of 
active duty personnel in domestic incidents. This act has traditionally been viewed as a 
major barrier to the use of U.S. military forces in planning for responses in the homeland 
(Colonel R. Cody, personal communication, April 14, 2011). 
The role of these DoD troops is governed under a federal law called the Posse 
Comitatus Act (which means the “power of the county”).  Research conducted by the 
U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Office resulted in a position paper, entitled The 
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Myth of Posse Comitatus Act, which found that this act has traditionally been viewed as 
“a major barrier to the use of U.S. military forces in planning for homeland defense” 
(Triebilock, 2006). The original intent of the act, which was passed in 1878, was to 
remove the Army from domestic law enforcement duties. As the role of DoD assets have 
been called into service for domestic emergencies over the past thirty years the intent of 
this act has changed.  Triebilock further concluded that, since 1980, Congress and the 
president have significantly eroded the prohibitions of the act in order to meet a variety of 
law enforcement challenges.  This new role includes drug interdictions and, after 9/11, 
the staffing of Civil Support Teams trained and equipped as hazardous materials units.    
a. Agency Culture  
The institutional culture of an agency directly affects the agency and its 
personnel. This culture can have a direct impact on disaster response.  For example, 
treating blast injury patients in a well-lit and heated emergency room is much different 
than treating the same patients in the middle of a disaster zone. The environment that 
personnel will eventually function in influences the way in which agency leaders initially 
train personnel in response. Because of this research, an important priority for the 
national preparedness planning effort in the next several years is for the public health, 
health care system, military, and homeland security to adopt joint multi-disciplinary 
prevent training programs. 
9. Joint Training Environments  
Participation in an environment designed to learn, practice, and integrate clinical, 
logistical and leadership skills in a collaborative atmosphere can strengthen individual 
and group skills in support of real-time disasters.  A Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
thesis, entitled Enhancing Unity of Effort in Homeland Defense Homeland Security and 
Civil Support through interdisciplinary education (2010), explored the topic of joint 
training. The following conclusion was reached: “…by integrating a variety of strategies 
and reports, this research acknowledges that the collaborative capacity built via multi-
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jurisdictional, interdisciplinary education as a method to enhance unity of effort and build 
a cadre of military and national security professionals” (Church, 2010). 
Initial and refresher training in every facet of emergency response and medical 
care is crucial. Training is the process of teaching or learning a skill or job. Military 
personnel receive extensive pre-deployment basic preparedness training, which includes 
self-preservation, job-specific education, and command and control. In contrast, civilian 
medical professionals concentrate most of their initial and refresher training on specific 
care delivery actions, such as medication administration, and spend little to no time on 
command and control or self-preservation. A credo of the U.S. military is “train the way 
you fight and fight the way you train” (D. McMillan, personal communication, April 7, 
2011).  The lack of a cooperative pre-event training venue may hamper disaster 
response—responders and health professions who may be forced to learn each other’s 
operational procedures while engaged in the response and while focusing on responder 
preservation logistics such as food and water supplies. 
a. Interdisciplinary Coordination 
Interagency coordination between agencies of the government at all level 
is essential. The general public and elected leaders of our nation demand that the entire 
network of response agencies and disciplines maintains a constant state of readiness to 
respond.  There must be a high degree of routine interaction between both the civilian and 
military response community. Understanding the procedures and processes of both 
military and civilian and response agencies is critical to success. 
The response to major outbreaks or disasters requires multi-agency 
communications and coordination before, during, and after an event.  An integral theme 
of the mission statements of nearly all response organization both military and civilian is 
to protect the lives and property of all of residents and visitors to the nation. As the 
national continues to enhance its preparedness efforts, interagency collaboration remains 
a primary focus for enhancing future response. 
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The nation is beginning to move in this direction with National Level 
Exercise (NLE) program.  The objective of these exercises is to build an integrated 
federal, state, tribal, local, and private sector capability to manage a catastrophic event 
and rapidly and effectively respond to and recover from any major disaster that occurs. 
Effectively preparing for emergency response takes collaboration. The 
best plans have little practical impact in a real-world response if emergency and risk 
coordinators do not work effectively together at all levels of a response. This starts on the 
ground at the scene of the emergency or outbreak by field teams and transition to 
collaborating among all levels of local, state, and federal response.   
10. Exercise and Evaluation  
a. Model Programs 
i.)  Department of Defense.  The Department of Defense has made 
available to its leaders a wide variety of educational opportunities focus on war-fighting 
skills. In the new world order and with a changing military mission, these skills have 
limited transferability. In the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the war-fighting mission has 
now changed to nation building. Military personnel are constantly participating in both 
individual and collective training evolutions. Military personnel make use of both 
tabletop and full-scale exercises to enhance their technical and operational skills.  The 
former Connecticut National Guard State Training Officer concluded that as we move 
forward into the future we must continue to train and exercise in a multi-disciplinary 
fashion.  According to Colonel Steve Gilbert “We need to train with our counterparts to 
not lose the opportunity to learn each other’s SOP’s” (Colonel S. Gilbert, personal 
communication, April 14, 2011).  
ii.)  U.S. Coast Guard.  New educational opportunities include 
programs such as Homeland Security Planning Course, under the direction the U.S. 
Department of Homeland security that includes personnel from the U.S. Coast Guard and 
local law enforcement. As the mission, posture has changed, so have the training for 
military officers these include Joint Staff Training focused on the DSCA mission.  
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iii.)  Public Health Workforce Development.  Limited availability 
of a properly trained healthcare workforce presents another obstacle when responding to 
disasters. Through presentations and discussions within the health system, leaders’ 
concerns have been raised about the capacity of Connecticut’s educational system to meet 
the state’s health care workforce needs, both current and future (General J. Galvin, 
personal communication, April 6, 2011). A January 2010, State of Connecticut, Allied 
Health Workforce Policy Board, Annual Legislative Report concluded that students 
entering health care training programs are not adequately prepared for disaster response. 
Employers need to provide extensive on-site training to new employees.  This training 
must include information on disaster response and preparedness for the institution in 
which they are working. 
11. Kirkpatrick Model of Evaluation 
In researching an evaluation process available to validate the effectiveness of 
these joint military and civilian training, a study published in the Journal of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management, “A Model for Assessing Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness Competencies and Evaluating Training Based on the Local Preparedness 
Plan” (Brand et al 2006). This article used the Kirkpatrick model (developed by Donald 
Kirkpatrick in the late 1950s) for evaluating the effectiveness of training. A number of 
researchers have adapted this training model. The basic structure of Kirkpatrick’s model 
has four-levels: 
• Level 1 (Reaction) 
• completed participant feedback questionnaire 
• informal comments from participants 
• focus group sessions with participants 
• Level 2 (Learning) 
• pre- and post-test scores 
• on-the-job assessments 
• supervisor reports 
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• Level 3 (Behavior) 
• completed self-assessment questionnaire 
• on-the-job observation 
• reports from customers, peers and participant’s manager 
• Level 4 (Results) 
• financial reports 
• quality inspections 
• interview with sales manager. (Brand et al., 2006) 
a. Adult Learning Styles  
In a joint training environment, the students’ perception of the need to 
learn should motivate them to learn. Adult learners come into each educational 
experience looking for a desired outcome.  Arizona Public Health Planner Steven Leib 
wrote that adults are autonomous and self-directed (2001). The students need to be free to 
direct themselves. Their teachers must actively involve adult participants in the learning 
process and serve as facilitators for them. This joint training must leverage these 
outcomes for the benefit of each student. The strengths and experiences of civilian and 
military responders must be shared with their counterparts. This training can enhance 
emergency communication while building effective disaster response leaders.   
12. Successful Joint Training Venues Projects  
Epidemics of emerging infectious diseases such as SARS, smallpox, and 
pandemic influenza, have resulted in an increased demand for hospital level medical 
services. For example, the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 
Canada and China resulted in the closure of several hospitals. Many states have 
developed alternate care locations including mobile field hospitals to support these 
responses. 
In grant guidance published in 2003 by the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, National Bioterrorism 
Hospital Preparedness Program (NBHPP) required each state to develop hospital bed 
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surge capacity of 500 beds per million of populations. This grant guidance included a 
deliverable to accomplish this goal (HHS, 2003). The grant work plan had to describe 
increasing hospital bed capacity to accommodate an increase in admissions from an 
infectious disease epidemic or disaster over an extended period. It also required how 
states would provide isolation and quarantine for patients infected with contagious 
diseases. 
The State of Connecticut Department of Public Health led the planning effort to 
investigate the following four options to address these new hospital surge capacity 
concerns: 
1. Pre-designation of one of Connecticut’s 32 acute care hospitals as an 
infectious disease/quarantine facility. 
2. Designation of the acute care hospital that receives the first case. 
3. Renovation and utilization of existing state property as an infectious 
disease quarantine facility. 
4. Adaptation and implementation of a mobile field hospital concept. 
The development of a mobile field hospital to provide surge and isolation capacity 
in Connecticut was selected as the most viable alternative.  As the plan was evolving, it 
was recognized that this surge capacity required the support of a multitude of agencies at 
the local, regional, and state levels. The Connecticut legislature approved public bond 
funding to procure a full field deployable 100-bed mobile hospital facility and its medical 
equipment.  Funding from the federal Department of Homeland Security and the 
Department of Health and Human Services was also secured to support this project.  
This 100-bed mobile field hospital was designed to serve as a multi-functional 
facility providing bed surge capacity, isolation capacity, and an emergency/disaster 
medicine training facility for the healthcare delivery workforce, both civilian and 
military. The facility is designed to be deployed as a flexible configuration of 25-bed 
units that can be operated jointly or independently of one another to provide triage and 
treatment anywhere in the state in the event of a mass casualty or to support an acute care 
hospital after catastrophic structural or mechanical failure. 
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This project benefited from a pre-existing partnership with the State Health 
Department including staff from Acute Care Hospitals; the Connecticut Fire Academy, 
which assisted with developing training modules and curriculum; and the Connecticut 
National Guard, which was tasked with providing logistical support to field operations.  
This collaboration has delivered an impressive record of accomplishment of successful 
program development, implementation, and exercising since 2008.  
Several key training objectives were identified including the need to develop 
clinical operating and facility management policies and protocols. The training and 
exercising of both clinical and, logistical personnel capable of facility deployment was 
also identified.  This training requirement was designed to training personnel from a 
variety of disciplines including military, NDMS, Medical Reserve Corp (MRC), and 
Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT).  All of the staff designated to deploy 
and support the MFH are required to complete education and training programs focused 
on discipline-specific core competencies. These include didactic and practical training in 
preparation to work in this field environment. 
It was quickly realized that this multi-disciplinary facility required a unique 
training venue where a diverse group of response professional could train in real- world 
environment for future response missions. The mobile field hospital and the delivery of 
medical care in a disaster were used as the basis for building the New England Disaster 
Training Center (NEDTC). The mission of the NEDTC is to provide disaster site 
awareness training for National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) teams as well as 
emergency responders both military and civilian.  
This model is designed to be a national center of excellence for capacity building 
in emergency response systems.  The NEDTC is located at Camp Hartell, in Windsor 
Locks, Connecticut. This facility is a Connecticut Air National Guard Base support base. 
Partner agencies in the development of this concept include the Connecticut Department 
of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, Connecticut Fire Academy, 
Connecticut DMAT, and Urban Search and Rescue Team (US&R). Funding for this 
project was provided through a 2004 Defense Appropriation awarded to the Connecticut 
Air Guard (CTAG). 
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The NEDTC was built to provide medical and search and rescue war-fighting 
skills and the ability to apply this training real-world austere situations.  Through a 
preexisting partnership with the CTAG and the NEDTC also provide static training 
opportunities for civilian personnel in aircraft operations, loading, and safety procedure 
for both fixed and rotary winged aircraft. The CTAG also provides several types of 
aircraft for static training including Chinooks (CH47), Blackhawk’s helicopters (UH60), 
and C-21 fixed wing jets, which have a medical mission capability. The facility also has 
training props to train the following rescue specialties including confined space rescue, 
structural collapse simulations, rail car rescue operations, and vehicular convoy training.  
The leadership of the NEDTC is comprised of both military and civilian 
personnel. Each of these leaders have a wide variety of educational and real-world 
experience, including a retired U.S. Air Force General Officer as well as retired officers 
and enlisted personnel with extensive deployment experience in both international and 
domestic support missions. The civilian staff includes physicians, emergency medical 
services instructors, and search and rescue professionals. The Connecticut National 
Guard’s medical assets are used on a regular basis to supplement staffing based upon 
their availability.  The staff also includes staff from two of the state’s federally 
recognized Medical Reserve Corps (MRC).    
The educational and training programs developed at the center combine clinical 
mentoring, programs, procedures, and printed resources along with hands-on equipment 
training and facility preparations.  In addition, physicians, nurses, allied health 
professionals, including those in laboratory, radiology, respiratory care as well as 
ancillary support staff. The training will also concentrate a separate educational tract on 
logistical and operations. 
Students are divided into discipline-specific groups for focused training that 
further defines their functions within the field environment during any disaster event.  
Through a partnership, the Connecticut Fire Academy and the Connecticut National 
Guard bases located in the state will serve as additional training and practical skills sites.  
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A partnership with the Hartford Hospital Simulation Center will provide validated 
training at all levels to enhance critical medical skills, making use of the latest computer 
enhanced medical simulation mannequins. These programs are run under the supervision 
of board certified medical professionals and career educators. Simulation has obvious 
benefits in all areas of health care including trauma, critical care, anesthesia, obstetrics, 
nursing, and emergency medicine. It is also being used in implementing and testing 
clinical protocols and in educational research. This teaching environment provides real-
time patient care scenarios at all clinical levels. This can be applied in a variety of 
settings to enhance staff performance. This partnership between the NEDTC and the 
Simulation Center provide an additional level of complexity for students.  It offers a state 
of the art training experience in both the clinical aspects of care delivery as well as 
operating in a controlled environment.   
All of the NEDTC student’s complete education and training programs focused 
on discipline-specific core competencies defined by the educations standards being 
developed for disaster operations.  The NEDTC provide students with extensive didactic 
and practical training in preparation to work in the austere field environment.  These 
courses are focused on events and scenarios related to bioterrorism, infectious disease 
outbreaks, and mass casualty disaster response requiring the integration of 
multidisciplinary response teams.  
Course content includes clinical policies and procedures, handling, and operations 
of medical equipment, Incident Command System, and communications both on scene 
and to other agencies including the military.  Vehicle convoy procedures, deploying, and 
restaging response equipment including the MFH is also covered. These programs will 
include clinical mentoring, along with hands-on equipment training and facility 
preparations.  
Functional exercises related to transporting, setting up, and restaging the facility 
will occur. The integration of operations with US&R medical components, as well as fire 
service trench rescue operations, will also be covered. Each training operation is designed 
to address a specific disaster scenario. Each training evolution will include post-tests and  
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practical exams to assess knowledge achievement, upon completion of educational 
programs. Tabletop, functional, and full-scale exercises are being conducted at the 
NEDTC.   
Students are asked to complete an end of course evaluation to assess the 
effectiveness of the clinical and facility training. The capability of the students to deliver 
high quality rescue operations and patient care is assessed by evaluators from each 
discipline. These evaluators recruited from military, police, fire, EMS, and search and 
rescue professionals. Hospital administrators, clinicians, and quality improvement experts 
will also evaluate the medical care delivery.  Results of these assessments are shared with 
the individual students, and they used to improve clinical and non-clinical educational 
and training programs.  All drills and exercises will be are followed with after action 
reports, both clinical and operational. These are used by NEDTC training staff as a tool to 
improvement and to modify the curriculum as needed. 
Additional training programs focus towards integrating civilian and military 
responders into a coordinated emergency response at both the operational, command, and 
control levels.  Key emergency management personnel from regions or states, including: 
hospital management, key hospital personnel, National Disaster Medical System 
(NDMS) personnel, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) representatives, 
local and state emergency planners, and National Guard Units, will be encouraged to 
participate in joint educational activities.  The NEDTC provides the broadest possible 
environment for response training in a controlled environment.  The NEDTC provides 
civilian and military participants the opportunity to learn, practice, and integrate clinical, 
logistical, and leadership skills in order to strengthen individual and group skills in 
support of real-time disasters.  
In the area of physician level education a curriculum has been developed to 
expose providers to the rigors of working in austere environments. This eight-hour 
program will provide medical professionals with an overview of disaster response, self-
preservation, and how to integrate with other responders such as military personnel, 
FEMA, and DMAT.  The concepts of risk assessment prior to the decision to respond to a 
disaster site will be explored with students. They will be exposed to rough terrain, 
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climate, insects, reptiles, and animal dangers. Each student will be given instruction on 
operational stress management techniques.  The physiology of sleep deprivation and 
fitness for duty will also be covered.  Personal hygiene including foot care, hydration, 
and nutrition will be covered. The appropriate clothing and footwear will be discussed, 
including how to pack and carry equipment. The final portion will cover meal preparation 
and potable water testing. This training will help fulfill a recommendation from the 
National Association of Emergency Physicians that states, “Emergency Medical Services 
(EMS) authorities should have a lead role in disaster response and collaborate with other 
appropriate agencies in a unified command structure as determined by the specific 
disaster. These physicians should participate in the four phases of disaster management 
for a defined community mitigation, planning, response, recovery” (NAEMSP, 2010, 
p. 4). 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The research method employed for this project is a qualitative analysis of data 
gathered during formal interviews. According to Rubin and Rubin (1995) this qualitative 
interviewing is a process of finding out what others feel and think about their worlds. The 
result is to understand the major points of their message and how it compares to this 
situation. This research was conducted using in-person interviews with military and 
civilian response leaders from the New England states. The interviewee’s selected 
represent a broad range of national and international response experience based on their 
vocations, despite all being from the region. A research question tool using open-ended 
questions was developed for this study. This method was selected as having the greatest 
potential to uncover firsthand accounts of success and failure from unit/team 
commanders who have operated during real-world missions with and without the benefits 
of joint pre-event command and control training. 
Interview candidate’s selection consisted of leadership personnel that engaged in 




operational relationships and the lack of an extensive pool of literature, research was 
primarily accomplished by interviewing selected leadership at interagency operational 
and policy levels. 
This included medical professional, civilian response leaders, and military 
commanders from both the full time and National Guard ranks. These operational level 
commanders have extensive experience in joint disaster operations from the following 
agencies.  
• Connecticut Department of Public Health 
• Connecticut National Guard  
• University of Connecticut, John Dempsey Medical Center  
• U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Chief Medical Officer Office 
• Yale New Haven Hospital 
Background of interviewees may be found in Appendix A.   
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II. SIGNIFICANCE 
The environment that personnel will eventually function in influences the way in 
which personnel are indoctrinated to their organizational culture by agency leaders. Each 
response system begins with command and control.  In general, both civilian and military 
personnel do not know how to request assistance from each other’s chain of command. 
The conclusions reached by this research can be used to shape future national and local 
training policies and curriculum presented to response agency leaders from both civil and 
military agencies.   
DoD assets and personnel represent the most substantial resource in the United 
States for consequence management following a catastrophic disaster or outbreak. It is 
imperative that the military become fully integrated into local and state response planning 
and exercising. This thesis provides policy proposals, for review by civilian health system 
leaders, National Guard command staff, and both the Departments of Homeland Security 
and Health and Human Services, to better integrate future preparedness activities. The 
product will be an improved pre-event education and training doctrine.   
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III. DATA COLLECTION 
The research process consisted of personal interviews. Each of the selected 
interviewees was asked the same set of questions in the same order. The questions were 
designed to obtain information about the interviewee’s experience and knowledge.  Each 
interview was audio taped with the participant’s consent. The recorded data was then 
transcribed. Interview questions encouraged people to talk about a topic without hinting 
that they should have a particular answer (Leedey & Ormond, 2010, p. 149). The 
questions, which were asked, were open ended to allow the respondent to share his/her 
experiences with this researcher.  A list of the interview questions may be found in 
Appendix B.   
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
The interview data was analyzed to identify ways to enhance command and 
control training and cooperative efforts between military and civilian response leaders. 
NPS Professor Gail Fann Thomas writes that analysis of the data requires the researcher 
to create a coding system for the data collected (2006, p. 7). These codes must be related 
to the topic being researched. As the data points are identified, a specific coding should 
be affixed to each data point discovered. All data analyzed for this project used a manual 
color-coded system. Once coded, the data was analyzed to identify themes and patterns. 
As Thomas suggests, the color codes create a thematic map (2011). This mapping 
provides a visual representation of patterns or similar themes to be drawn from the data.  
Major themes emerged in the areas of leadership, communications coordination, 
command, and control.  
In reviewing the data, the main themes were evident in the feedback of each 
interviewee. These were color coded and classified as follows; 
• Ethical Decision Making Red 
• Communications Coordination Blue 
• Conflict Management Green 
• Leadership Orange 










LG Blum  2 3 4 1 
COL Cody 2 4 3 1 
Dr. Galvin 2 3 4 1 











COL Gross 1 3 4 2 
Dr. Kamin 1 2 4 3 
LCD MacMillan 2 3 4 1 
LTC Schulthess 3 2 4 1 




Because of this research, an important priority for the national preparedness 
planning effort in the next several years is for the public health, health care system, 
military, and homeland security to adopt joint multi-disciplinary prevent training 
programs. Our national system of disaster response operations is primarily based with 
civilian response organizations. It is critical that there be interagency communication and 
coordination at all levels of government: local, state, tribal, and federal. Each agency 
must have a mandate to assign interagency liaisons both vertically and horizontally 
amongst all levels of response. At the federal level, this includes with the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), DoD, CDC, and FEMA.  
Interagency coordination between agencies of the government at all level is 
essential. There must be a high degree of routine interaction between both the civilian 
and military response community. The response to major outbreaks or disasters requires 
multi-agency communications and coordination, before during, and after an event.  An 
integral theme of the mission statements of nearly all response organization both military 
and civilian is to protect the lives and property of all of residents and visitors to the 
nation. As the national continues to enhance its preparedness efforts interagency 
collaboration remains a primary focus for enhancing future response. 
The nation is beginning to move in this direction with National Level Exercise 
(NLE) program.  The objective of this exercise is to build an integrated federal, state, 
tribal, and local levels and private sector capability to manage a catastrophic event and to 
rapidly and effectively respond to and recover from any major disaster that occurs. 
The functional exercise offers agencies and jurisdictions a way to test their plans 
and skills in a real-time, realistic environment and to gain the in-depth knowledge that 
only experience can provide. Participants will exercise response and recovery functions 
that are critical to responding to a catastrophic event. Lessons learned from the exercise 
will provide valuable insights to guide future planning for disasters and other 
emergencies. 
 40 
NLE guidance published by FEMA is intended to use a comprehensive evaluation 
process. These exercises are designed to assess response and recovery capabilities at the 
local, regional, and national levels. The exercise is designed to validate the following 
capabilities: 
• Communications 
• Critical resource logistics and distribution 
• Mass care (sheltering, feeding, and related services) 
• Medical surge 
• Citizen evacuation and shelter-in-place 
• Emergency public information and warning 
• Emergency operations center (EOC) management 
• Long-term recovery. (FEMA, 2011) 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary question explored by this thesis is how can we design an effective 
model for the pre-event joint command and control training of disaster responders both 
military and civilian. The recommendations are as follows: 
1. Recommendation 1 
The development of a national training and educational platform must move 
forward. This new policy doctrine would be intended to promulgate a multi-functional, 
cross-disciplinary curriculum. The center piece of which would be regionally based Joint 
Training Centers of Excellence (JTCE) for national disaster teams, civilian hospital 
personnel, National Guard and Reserve military emergency medical personnel training in 
domestic emergency medical deployment and response.  The goal of the TCE must be to 
provide civilian and military participants the opportunity to learn, practice, and integrate 
clinical, logistical, and leadership skills in order to strengthen individual and group skills 
in support of real time disasters. The center must focus on deployment training of 
National Disaster Medical teams and Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams as well as 
military support units such as CST. Each must provide a venue for the integration of aero 
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medical assets and personnel. The goal of the TCE will be to provide the broadest 
possible environment for training. These facilities must serve as an effective emergency 
preparedness education and training tool integrating civilian, governmental, and military 
experience and expertise for local, regional, and national audiences.   
2. Recommendation 2 
This concept is of responder integration is beginning to move forward as the CDC 
published it 2011 Public Health Emergency Preparedness Grant Guidance to state in 
April of 2011. The overall objective of the new cooperative agreement is to set standards 
for public health preparedness planning, organize and structure efforts, and define 
benchmarks for success.  (CDC 2011) The CDC has worked closely with variety of 
preparedness partners on all levels to combine multiple policies and guidance documents.  
These new performance standards are being put into place monitor program improvement 
while encouraging stakeholder engagement. The guidance each of the 15 capabilities will 
consist of a definition, followed by critical functions, essential tasks, and resource 
elements necessary to meet said capability.  The 15 capabilities include the following: 
5. Medical supplies management and distribution 
6. Volunteer management and recruitment 
7. Medical surge 
8. Emergency operations coordination 
9. Responder safety and health 
10. Medical countermeasure dispensing 
11. Fatality management 
12. Non-pharmaceutical interventions 
13. Mass care 
14. Public health surveillance and epidemiologic investigation 
15. Public health laboratory testing 
16. Emergency public information and warning 
17. Information sharing 
18. Community preparedness 
19. Community recovery. (CDC,2011)  
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3. Recommendation 3 
The National Response Plan was originally released in 2007 by the Department of 
Homeland Security as a multi-disciplinary, all-hazards plan intended to establish a single, 
comprehensive framework for managing domestic incidents. It was revised in 2008 as the 
National Response Framework (NRF) (FEMA, 2008). It defined key roles and structures 
for response. It organizes the way that this nation responds to emergencies and disasters. 
A key component of future national planning efforts must include pre event joint training. 
It must be focused on the coordination of military assistance in its role to supplementing 
state, local, and tribal response to disaster needs. 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research needs to be conducted in the areas of interagency cooperation 
and coordination and pre-event joint training for disaster response. Some specific areas 
include: command and control. 
C. CHALLENGES 
The corner stone of any national disaster response planning effort is support from 
interagency partners and the community being responded to in times of crisis. This 
includes not only fiscal support but also support of policies and procedures. High value 
must be placed on the inclusion of all people within the community. Every attempt must 
be made to make disaster services ready and available to provide a high level of service.  
Strong leaders in an organization must have a strong moral value system. A strong 
willed leader will not bow to external pressures. Leaders must follow highly ethical 
standards in their conduct each day. Leadership takes courage and a willingness to 
change the status quo. Leaders’ biggest challenge is motivation of the staff to continue to 
work toward fulfilling their agency’s mission. A team can only be effective when it 




suggestions staff at all levels. An agency is only as good as its staff, and its staff is only 
as good as its leader.  These leadership skills can be developed and enhanced by 
participation in joint pre-event response training. 
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEWEE BACKGROUNDS 
Lieutenant General H Steven Blum retired as the Chief, National Guard Bureau. 
He was the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for formulating, 
developing and coordinating all policies, programs and plans affecting more than half a 
million Army and Air National Guard personnel. He was holds a BA Degree from 
University of Baltimore and an MS from Morgan State College. He is also a 1989 
graduate of the U.S. Army War College. General Blum has commanded at every level to 
include a Special Forces Operational Detachment-A, a Light Infantry Battalion and an 
Infantry Brigade, and a Division Support Command. Prior to commanding the 29th 
Infantry Division (Light), General Blum served as Assistant Adjutant General for Army, 
Commanding General, Maryland Army National Guard, and Assistant Division 
Commander (Support), 29th Infantry Division (Light). General Blum served as the 
Commanding General for Multinational Division (North) SFOR-10 in Operation Joint 
Forge, Bosnia Herzegovina. 
Brigadier General J. Robert Galvin, M.D. MD, MPH, MBA, Fellow FACAP Dr. 
Galvin a 28 Years U.S. Army Reserve veteran served as the Commanding Officer of a 
ten man forward medical company in Vietnam for twelve months in 1966-67.  He is an 
Army War College graduate. He completed his medical training at Tufts University and 
his MBA at the University of Connecticut.  He served as the Commissioner of the 
Connecticut Department of Public Health from 2003 until 2011.  Throughout his military 
career he has commanded several units including the 819th Station Hospital, 173rd 
Medical Group and Deputy Commander of the 804th Medical Brigade and run a field 
hospital in the European Command during the cold war.  
Colonel Steven Gilbert, is the former Joint Training Officer, Connecticut Army 
National Guard. Colonel Gilbert is a U.S. War College graduate who served one year in 
Afghanistan as an Infantry Battalion Commander. Throughout his military career he has 
commanded several units including the 169th Regional Training Institute (RTI). The RTI 
is responsible for a number of academic programs including delivery of Officer 
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Candidate School (OCS) training for the Northeast region. He is a Joint Qualified Officer 
and is qualified to serve as a Joint Task Force Commander during domestic emergencies. 
This background of training and leading soldiers gives Colonel Gilbert the background 
and experience in the pre event training area.   
Dr. Richard Kamin, State of Connecticut Office of Emergency Medical Services 
Medical Director, Responder as physician with the CT-1 DMAT for Hurricane Ike, EMS 
program director University of CT Health Center, Hartford Hospital EMS Fellowship 
Director B.S. Biology from the University of Washington, Seattle WA MD from the 
University of Washington, Seattle WA Emergency Medicine Residency, University of 
CT EMS Fellowship, Hartford Hospital, University of CT. 
Colonel Mark Schulthess, PA-C, is the Medical Officer for 14th CST, of the 
Connecticut National Guard. Colonel Schulthess joined the United Sates Army in 1968 
and is a combat veteran s having served as a K-9 handler in Vietnam 1969. After 
returning from the war he served as MP and was eventually accepted into the PA-C at 
George Washington University. He has served in a variety of direct patient care delivery 
positions in both his military and civilian medical career. As the medical officer for the 
14th CST he was responsible to for the safety of his personnel during their response to an 
anthrax case in Danbury, Connecticut in 2009.  
Colonel  Robert Cody, former Commander 118th Medical Battalion  He began his 
career in the Connecticut National Guard in 1982 and attended Officer candidate Scholl 
in 1984 and commanded and  Infantry Unit. In 1991 Colonel Cody transferred to the 
Medical Service Corp and in October of 2001 was appointed as the C/O 118th Medical 
Battalion. He deployed with the 118th to the War in Iraq as the Commander and in 2008 
assumed his current role as the Personnel Officer for the Connecticut National Guard. 
Lieutenant Commander Donald MacMillan, PA-C in the U.S. Naval Reserves, is 
the Emergency Management Coordinator at Yale New Haven Hospital and holds a 
clinical instructor appointment to the Yale School of Medicine. He has deployed for two 
different tours in support of the war in Iraq in 2005 and 2008 as a member of the 4th 
Medical Battalion. He began his career as a civilian Paramedic with the New Haven 
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Ambulance in 1989 and graduated from the Yale Physician Assistant program in 1995.  
He led a medical support contingent from the Yale School of Medicine in support of 
international aid to the Haiti earthquake. 
Ronald I Gross, M.D., COL, MC, USAR (ret) , Chief Division of Trauma and 
Emergency Surgery Services, Baystate Medical Center, Springfield, Massachusetts.  Dr 
Gross served as the Deputy Commander of Clinical Services of the 912th FST from July 
through October of 2003, and is the former Chief of Surgery and Chief of Professional 
Services of the 405th Combat Support Hospital.  He has deployed in support of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom with the 912th FST, where he provided medical support to front line 
troops. Dr Gross is heavily involved on the training of civilian medical responders to 
disasters, and one of the original faculty and authors of the Disaster Management and 
Emergency Preparedness Course of the American College of Surgeons Committee on 
Trauma (ACS COT). He currently is a member of the disaster preparedness committees 
of the Eastern Association for the Surgery on Trauma, the American Association for the 
Surgery on Trauma and the ACS COT. 
Michael F. Zanker, MD FACEP currently serves as Senior Medical Officer in the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security. 
Dr. Zanker received his MD from the Chicago Medical School in 1993. He 
completed his residency training in emergency medicine at the University of Connecticut 
followed by a fellowship in EMS at Hartford Hospital. He is currently on staff at Hartford 
Hospital and holds the position of Assistant Professor of Emergency Medicine at the 
University Of Connecticut School Of Medicine.  
Prior to joining the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Health Affairs, 
Dr. Zanker served as the Connecticut Department of Public Health’s state EMS medical 




He has held the positions of Medical Director for the Capitol Region (Hartford, 
CT) MMRS program as well as Unit Commander of CT-1 Disaster Medical Assistance 
Team (CT-1 DMAT). Dr. Zanker has had practical experience on numerous DMAT 
deployments, including Hurricane Katrina.  
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Overview of pre-event training by discipline  
2. Specific command and control training 
3. Success or failure operating in a real world mission scenario 
4. Experienced with joint military/civilian interactions 
5. Obstacle is real or perceived to joint training 
6. Respondent’s thoughts on value of joint prevent training 
7. Other observations 
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